
Testing new Ukrainian tactics using Battlegroup Clash: Baltics
21 hours ago
6 min read
4
180
0
Can Battlegroup Clash: Baltics model Ukraine’s new approach to combined arms manoeuvre?
I read with great interest this excellent new insight paper from Dr Jack Watling of RUSI. Titled ‘Emergent Approaches to Combined Arms Manoeuvre in Ukraine’ it looks at how Ukraine forces are developing their own approach to combined arms manoeuvre, and what NATO forces might take from it.
Aside from academic interest, I read with half a mind on how well Battlegroup Clash: Baltics (BC:B) - my forthcoming land warfare game on a hypothetical Russian invasion of Estonia - captures, or could capture, this new Ukrainian approach in the 'contested zone', which is the focus of BC:B.
I was fairly confident that it could do the job, but I decided to test it*, because, well, I could. That’s the benefit and half the point of a manual wargame like BC:B.
*I tested it using the Tabletop Simulator mod I created for the game, screenshots from which are what you see in this blog.
Was I right? Read on and see.
The scenario
I decided to use the area of Näpi, a small borough of the town of Rakvere, which is on Map D in BC:B. It’s operationally important as it sits between two major roads. Here’s some imagery of it from Google Maps, and below that, from the BC:B map.


I envisage it being defended by two understrength, but dug-in Russian infantry platoons. In keeping with the Ukrainian doctrine, NATO attacks with a reinforced company, with battalion assets supporting the company. This comprises a platoon of main battle tanks and two platoons of armoured infantry. And Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).
I don’t have UGVs in BC:B as they are not part of NATO’s current doctrine or ORBAT (though various forces are experimenting, including the UK and Estonia). But Dr Watling highlights their role in the new Ukrainian doctrine, so I will add them in.
Since the Milrem THeMIS UGV is built in Estonia and of interest to the British Army, I’ll say that’s the model being used. It can be armed with a 30mm autocannon. I’ll use two counters to represent two pairs of UGVs. I’ll give each counter an Apers and Atk Firepower Value of 1, but allow them to combine fire in a single action, bringing it up to Apers 2 and Atk 2. This is comparable to a platoon of BMPs, which might be being generous.
The theory, in practice
Dr Watling sets out the emerging Ukrainian approach as comprising seven phases.
Phase 1: Survey
Phase 2: Isolate
Phase 3: Degrade
Phase 4: Fix
Phase 5: Suppress
Phase 6: Close and Destroy
Phase 7: Consolidate
I will skip phases 1 to 3. Each of these phases are intended to last 24-48 hours, in the build up to the assault. Scenarios in BC:B capture the 2 to 3 hours best reflected in phases 4 to 6.
For my review of each phase, I begin with a summary in italics of the Ukrainian approach, summarised from the RUSI paper.
Phase 4: Fix - Deploy persistent FPV drone coverage to prevent enemy redeployment and freeze their defensive positions, ensuring intelligence gathered earlier remains valid during the assault even if the drones lack specific targets.
In my scenario, two Russian BMPs look to cycle out exhausted troops with replacements. A supply vehicle follows. NATO UAS drone coverage is high. The UAS drones are the circular counters in the image below, and the yellow dotted lines represent the range of their ISTAR coverage in the game.

As the Russian vehicles move into the line of sight of one of the UAS, the NATO side calls in FPVs to attack. FPV A attacks the BMPs. I won’t go into the mechanics of combat resolution here, but it takes two attacks for the FPVs to score a hit, something that the FPV is able to achieve in BC:B as they can ‘swarm’.
The hit reduces the reinforcements to half their effectiveness, and the remaining BMP force retreats back. Meanwhile the Sect (Russian resupply force element) is easy pickings for FPV B, which eliminates it.
The Russian forces are fixed in their defensive positions.
Phase 5: Suppress - Infiltrate support weapons mounted on UGVs to provide sustained fire while using EW, conventional artillery, and rockets to suppress enemy positions. Initiate assault during thermal crossover and poor weather when UAV performance is degraded but conventional artillery remains effective against preregistered targets.
I apply the optional BC:B weather rules ‘Low clouds, high winds’, which reduces the effectiveness of line of sight of UAS to one grid square, and the effectiveness of FPVs.
Now for the UGVs. The UK has recently announced it will integrate its THeMIS UGVs with UAS, so I give the UGVs a DRM bonus to reflect this where there is UAS coverage, as is the case here.
I give the UGVs two turns - around 30-60 mins - to achieve a result, before Russian UAS and FPVs arrive. On the first turn I have them split fire between the two visible dug-in Russian force elements, but it has no effect (after modifiers they need to roll 9+ on 2D6).
On the second turn I combined their fire on the larger Russian force. They only need an 8+, but still fail. On the third turn the Russian drones arrive, but NATO has the initiative and on this attempt they get a Suppression result, before the FPVs start hitting.

I have no rules for the thermal cross-over; I could argue they are part of the weather effects, but frankly it’s a concept I had not heard of until this article (though it makes sense).
Thus, as soon as the suppression is in effect, the assault begins.
Phase 6: Close and Destroy - Commit assault forces supported by tanks and APCs to deliberately clear enemy positions. Use armoured vehicles to provide firepower, draw enemy fire, and protect infantry during dismount, then systematically clear positions.

In BC:B this phase is the assault. An assault can only take place within 1,000m, so it requires the assaulting forces to move into position the turn before. Reflecting that this is a prepared assault, I allow NATO to play the 'UAS spoofing' EW Chit effect, with failure only on a ‘1’. This near auto-success is not in the current BC:B rules, but will be added in a forthcoming EW advanced rules supplement for the game. A downside for NATO of the new rules is that the EW also jams friendly drones, so neither side has a UAS for the duration of the assault.
The lack of UAS is made up for by a NATO Fire Support Team calling in artillery fire. They do so on the pre-prepared fire coordinates, as set on the Sync Matrix*, targeting the Russian platoon that was suppressed in the previous turn. The artillery scores a hit, which puts an automatic suppression on the platoon.
*In BC:B, indirect fire support assets are given a fire plan that sets out their pre-prepared targets for the duration of the game.
Meanwhile, the advancing NATO assault forces pour fire onto the section on the north east of the town, eliminating it. The suppressed Russian force pulls back inside the town to get out of the line of sight of the FST.

On the next turn the proper assault begins. The Russian overwatch fire has no effect on the income APCs, though on another day it could have.
After the NATO infantry dismounts, with the force elements participating it's a 3:1 ratio favouring the attacker. DRM bonuses accrue for the presence of the HQ and combined arms effect. However, since one of the Russian platoons is not suppressed, the attackers do not get a benefit for Russian suppression.
The result is one hit inflicted on the defenders, which are forced to pull back to the outskirts of Näpi, and one hit on the attackers.

Both sides then go into a reorganisation from the assault. NATO forces will need a turn or two more to clear out the remaining Russian forces - entering into the Consolidate phase - but the goal of clearing the Russians from their positions has been achieved.
Conclusions
UGVs aside, I’m not convinced this experiment showed the Ukrainian approach to be that much different to how NATO would currently conduct such an assault. Certainly it is how I would conduct an assault in the game, even being unaware of the RUSI paper.
Could that be a flaw with the BC:B's model for assaults? Certainly the model does not consider suppression in the same way as the Ukrainians; it's not considered as important, and it's fairly easy to recover from. A form of ‘continued suppression’ due to fire is a future mechanic I need to consider.
Another factor could be my assumption when designing the BCB Scenarios that Battalion support assets would be made available to an attacking NATO Battlegroup. This assumption may be wrong.
But largely, I think my main finding is that BC:B can model the Ukrainian approach. And this isn't surprising. Much that is new in the Ukrainian approach relates to the 'middle' and 'deep' battle, rather than the 'contested zone'.
I would definitely add UGVs to a next iteration of BC:B, or if there’s an expansion. This is a challenge with designing a modern wargame in a time of war - developments on the battlefield move quicker than the speed of board game production.
Fortunately, as I have demonstrated here, there are solutions within the existing counter mix and rule design. The advanced EW rules will be coming in a free supplement, available soon I hope.
An experiment for another day will be to see if I can use it to capture the Russian infiltration approach.





